

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

JUN 8 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
 CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 DIRECTORS OF DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Degradation of Operational Readiness/Mission
 Accomplishment Due to Personnel Security
 Investigative Shortfalls

Since FY 78, the Defense Investigative Service completion times for background investigations have gone from 70 days to over 155 days. The FY-80 backlog of 33,898 cases has grown to over 83,000 and is expected to approach 100,000 by the end of this fiscal year, with case completion times of 171 days. DIS is currently opening 1,000 cases a week more than are closed.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense has continually stressed the need to limit requests for personnel security investigations to the absolute minimum level required for mission accomplishment. Nevertheless, there is an increasing proliferation of clearances granted throughout DoD with the inevitable effect of raising the odds for security compromise. The burgeoning volume of investigative requests has clogged the investigative pipelines and overtaxed the resources allocated to conduct investigations.

This situation has resulted in large numbers of personnel without security clearances--who cannot be productively utilized. For example, in one sensitive program, the cost of the delay in manpower utilization is estimated at over \$41 million.

Positive actions must be taken to bring the situation into proper balance. Accordingly, the following personnel security policies are effective this date:

- a. A moratorium is placed on all Periodic Reinvestigations.

Not referred to OSD - On file
 release instructions apply.

- o Notwithstanding any previously authorized requirement, Background Investigations shall not be conducted on persons whose access is only at the Secret or lower level--except for immigrant aliens.
- o Background/Special Background Investigations are not authorized for summer hires. (Clearance of summer hires shall be no higher than Secret.)
- o The Personal Interview-Oriented Background Investigation shall be conducted in lieu of the present Background Investigation.
- o Heads of DoD Components shall make increased efforts to upgrade the effectiveness of command internal security programs as required by Chapter IX, DoD Regulation 5208.2-R, and Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/14.


The foregoing actions will continue until a manageable backlog of 20,000 cases is achieved, at which time the DIS situation and personnel security policy will be reevaluated.

It is recognized that the measures outlined above represent a departure from routine practice. However, we are faced with a critical situation which will have an unacceptable adverse impact upon our mission accomplishment unless these actions are taken.

Consideration is also being given to utilizing the new type BI (referred to above) in lieu of the present SBI. I have asked the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to give me his recommendation on this proposal within thirty days.

In addition, with a view toward reducing the DIS investigative backlog as rapidly as possible, each Military Department is requested to identify as many investigative personnel (including associated administrative support) as possible for temporary detail to DIS. Your review of available personnel should include consideration of the use of reservists, both individual and unit. Each department will arrange for necessary funding to support this effort. It is also requested that a general/flag officer be designated as the point of contact to assist in arranging for this augmentation of DIS.

Your personal participation in putting these policies into effect is vital to turning the situation around.


Frank C. Carlucci